This is the first of a series of posts regarding the subject of William Shirer's book, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. After reading the book, it is hard for me not to wonder what would have happened if France and Britain were governed by 'warmongers' instead of 'peace lovers' in the pre-war years. Throughout the 1930s, the French and British missed many opportunities to stop Hitler, resulting in near fatal consequences for them.
When the Rhineland was reoccupied by German troops, the German generals were terrified of the possibility of French hostilities. In the book, Shirer reveals that the Germans were fatally outnumbered, and if the French opened fire on them, they would have been forced to retreat. According to documents cited in the book, if the Germans were forced to retreat, there would have been a serious possibility that the Nazi regime would have collapsed. Instead the French allowed the Germans to re-militarize the Rhineland, handing Hitler a huge victory and effectively destroying the Treaty of Versailles.
Another blunder which led to the outbreak of The Second World War was the Munich Pact. Czechoslovakia had a large, modern army with formidable mountain defences, equal to the French Maginot Line. Most German Generals believed that it would be almost impossible to break through them and invade Czechoslovakia. In addition to this, the people of Germany were dead set against war. Most of the Generals and Officers believed that the German Army would be slaughtered by the Czechoslovaks, and that the lightly defended frontier with France would collapse if the French went to war (it was assumed they would because France had a military alliance with Czechoslovakia). The Generals believed that if the German army was bogged down in the mountainous terrain on the Czechoslovak border, France's 100 divisions would overrun Germany's 20 divisions on the western front, leading to military disaster.
In order to prevent the ruin of Germany, the Generals came up with a plan for a military coup. According to Shirer, when Hitler would give the order to attack, the army would carry out a coup and arrest Hitler and put in his place a provisional government that would be 'anti-Nazi'. All that the Generals needed was a firm declaration by Britain and France that they would go to war against Germany if Czechoslovakia was invaded. As we all know, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain formulated the Munich agreement, forcing the fully mobilized Czech army to back down, and preserving peace for 11 months.
The sacrifice of Czechoslovakia ironically led to the outbreak of the war that Chamberlain so desperately wanted to avoid. It could be argued that if the coup failed, or did not occur, the German army would have met disaster against the Czechoslovaks and the French and British could have dealt a death blow to Nazi Germany. It is easy to argue that if the war had begun by the invasion of Czechoslovakia instead of by the invasion of Poland a year later, the British and the French would have had the upper hand against Germany, instead of the other way around. Chamberlain should have advocated war when the conditions were favorable instead of formulating a short period of peace.
Readers of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich do not have long to ponder these 'what ifs' because they are quickly led into the secret negotiations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939 (the topic of the next post in this series).
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
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6 comments:
As someone that has Shirer's book in a place of prominence on his bookshelf I can appreciate your fascination with it. That said I find the "what if" scenario replacing French and British doves for hawks spurious. Shirer tries to impress how the war could have been stopped early on through tough action, as do many of his contemporaries, however the reality is the politicians weren't doves. Their people were. In a democracy you watch public opinion and opinion was strongly against any action provoking war after the horrors of WWI. Even if a leader went down this road regardless of public sentiment he faced revolt from the back benches. Furthermore the depression was in full swing and there was little money for arms, let alone war. Projections held that the air war alone would account for untold casualties. Chamberlain was advised by his ministers that there was not enough cut timber in all of Britain for the caskets that would be needed in the first week of bombing just on London itself. Grossly exagerated looking back, it was a reality of the time. As for General Beck's plot against Hitler the actual details are fanciful if not weak for the Brits to actually move on, and the outcome less than certain, even now. In the end I think more can be gleaned from the "how comes?" of Shirer's book and history far more than from the "what ifs?".
I read the book eons ago maybe when I was 17 or 18. I found it pretty engrossing as well. At the time it was pretty much the best anyone had come to telling the storey of that era. I would think it holds up pretty well today despite more archives and such opening up ie from the old Soviet Union. A real epic book - I credit it with igniting my interest in history and politics.
An interesting analysis, Castor Rouge. However, I remeber reading in another book, Troublesome Young Men by Lynne Olson that many in Britain were agianst the peace of Munich, partialy because the odds were in their favour. Also, the people may have been doves, but Neville Chamberlain was the biggest dove of all, when war broke out he id absolutley nothing, it was First Lord Churchill who was waging the war at sea, and pushed far the failed invasion of Normandy, but we all know that by the time Churchill, a true war leader came to power, it was to late, France was doomed.
I didn't read the book, but intuitively feel you are right. Yet what does it mean? How can these "what ifs?" help us to deal with current mess of Russia-Georgia war, for example.
What is your message in the concrete. What do you offer us for our daily walk - for the recognition of the eternal values underfoot
All good comments. Given the sources we have, the overwhelming evidence shows that as castor points out, appeasement was popular not just in Britain but in France. That memories of the Great War and preventing war at all costs was the popular course of action (if not ill-advised).
However, we also know now thanks to the opening of Soviet archives that Stalin was prepared to defend Cze if Bri+Fra were willing to stand their ground.
As for the present, as many Historians point out, reckless use of the "appeasement" analogy is both anachronistic and dangerous. There are things we can learn from that chapter in history but every situation is unique and therefore requires a unique solution.
This book is in my home library, but I haven't read it yet. Based on your comments, it will have to move closer to the front of my TBR roster.
Again, I am pleased that you joined the Political Conservatives group on LibraryThing. It is always nice to have group discussions about books -- perhaps you would consider posting your review as a new topic to see if it generates discussion?
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